Komron Tursunmurodov

Image source: www.baltic-review.com

In recent years, Uzbekistan’s population showed a growing interest in acquiring religious knowledge, by exercising their Constitutional rights to profess any religion and seek, obtain, and disseminate any information. However, there have been several cases of people illegally storing, importing, and distributing religious materials, raising concerns before law enforcement and the judiciary regarding the interpretation of illegal distribution of religious materials. This has sparked debates about whether “liking” a particular religious content on social media platforms constitutes illegal distribution.

To tackle this issue, the present blog post aims to analyze the concept of illegal distribution of religious materials based on recent judicial practices (2023-2024) and shed light on the issues surrounding the classification of “liking” religious content as illegal distribution.

Case #1: “Liking” is a Form of Distribution

On December 13, 2023, a citizen A.O. watched and liked four videos on the platform Odnoklassniki.ru. These videos were banned in Uzbekistan due to their promotion of religious hatred. Consequently, the criminal court classified “liking” these videos as distribution of materials promoting religious hatred and ruled that A.O. has an administrative liability for this action based on Art. 1843 of the Code on Administrative Liability (CAL).

Some activists criticized this court ruling since, in their opinion, liking videos does not mean distributing them but one’s approval of or support for (someone or something) by using a particular icon or link on social media platforms.

The press service of the criminal court responded that the ruling was based on the expert opinion of specialists from the Agency for Information and Mass Communications. According to their opinion #22-4076, when a user of Odnoklassniki.ru “likes” any text, audio, or video on their page, this content is automatically displayed (except when the restriction on page visibility available only to the user is activated) in the newsfeed of virtual friends and subscribers of the page owner, effectively spreading among them. Hence, “liking pages” might be classified as “distribution.” Furthermore, A.O. did not activate the restriction, causing automatic share with subscribers of the content he/she “liked.” Thus, the judge concluded that A.O. illegally distributed materials promoting religious hatred and imposed an administrative punishment.

Case #2: Sole Act of “Liking” Does Not Constitute Distribution

On February 19, 2024, a citizen S.O. watched and liked prohibited videos on YouTube. During the court hearings, specialists opined that pressing the “like” button on YouTube constitutes supporting the content but not distributing it. The court also considered that S.O. only watched and liked these videos without sharing or recommending them to others. The judge highlighted the lack of evidence to prove S.O.’s guilt in distributing religious content, emphasizing that the sole act of “liking” cannot be classified as distribution. Therefore, the criminal court terminated the administrative case due to a misleading classification of S.O.’s actions.

Interpretation of Distribution

While judicial practice decides this issue on a case-by-case basis, the academic interpretation of the “distribution” can also provide a valid solution.

First, the Regulation on the procedure for the preparation, import, and distribution of materials of religious content and conducting a religious examination defines the distribution of religious content as “a sale, delivery, distribution, sending and subscription of religious materials on the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan, including through the Internet, other electronic means of transmission.” Notably, this definition repeats the word “distribution,” resulting in its broad interpretation.

Second, Rustambayev highlights that illegal distribution of religious content involves any form of alienation of third parties’ favor (e.g. sale, throwing them under the doors of houses, distribution on the streets) or bringing their contents to the attention of third parties (e.g. sewing leaflets, publishing in the media, speaking to an audience, using e-mail and other network features like the Internet).

Distributing religious materials means making them accessible to third parties through various methods. Therefore, liking could be a distribution if it causes access to or sharing with others.

Intention in Liking

Though crimes involving distribution require intent, the court failed to investigate its presence in Case #1. The court found guilty A.O. primarily based on the expert conclusion. However, the court did not analyze whether A.O. intended to distribute or just liked the videos without considering the outcomes.

If A.O. intended to distribute the videos, this would indicate a deliberate action to share the prohibited content with others, possibly to propagate illegal materials. The intent to distribute indicates an awareness and willingness to engage in criminal behavior, making A.O. guilty of the crime. This scenario demonstrates a violation of laws, justifying the court’s decision to impose a penalty.

Conversely, if A.O. had no intention of distributing the videos and merely liked them for personal reasons, the situation would be different. In this scenario, A.O.’s actions do not indicate criminal intent, signifying the lack of corpus delicti, the elements of the crime. Hence, the court cannot bring A.O. to justice.

Since intent is essential in determining crimes involving distribution, failing to investigate intent leads to unjust verdicts, where individuals may be wrongfully penalized for actions that do not reflect an actual criminal intention. Therefore, courts must rigorously examine the presence or absence of intent to deliver fair and equitable justice.

Liking and Freedom of Speech

Liking religious content can be considered a form of freedom of speech, encompassing the right to express the beliefs and opinions of individuals. Freedom of speech is a fundamental human right protected under the Constitution, enshrining the right to hold and express diverse opinions, including those related to religion. Individuals are entitled to access and engage with religious content without fear of censorship or punishment, provided that the content does not provoke violence or hatred.

Furthermore, liking content on social media is a common way for individuals to express their opinions and beliefs. This digital expression is an extension of traditional forms of speech and is similarly protected. While liking religious content is generally protected, the context of the content and the intent behind the action can affect its legal standing. For instance, if the content liked is part of a broader pattern of behavior that violates other laws (e.g. promoting terrorism), it may not be protected.

Therefore, liking religious content is typically considered part of freedom of speech, as it represents an individual’s right to express and support their religious beliefs. However, this right is not absolute and should not contravene other legal and societal interests.

Conclusion

This blog post discussed the questions of legal liability for “liking” prohibited religious content on social media in Uzbekistan. Even though liking can be a form of distribution if it causes third-party access, the sole act of liking without sharing does not entail liability. Though crimes involving distribution require intent, courts, unfortunately, often fail to investigate intent and impose penalties based solely on the action. Furthermore, the blog post highlighted that liking falls under freedom of speech and is protected by the Constitution only if it does not violate public morality or the rights and freedoms of others.

Cite as:  Komron Tursunmurodov, “Analysis of Judicial Practice: Is There Liability for “Liking” Religious Content on Social Media?”, Uzbekistan Law Blog, 22.07.2024.